In this paper, I study whether there is any evidence that the market scale surrounding a central administrative o±ce (CAO), which includes corporate headquarters, in°uences a¯rm's cost-e®ectiveness in procuring business services. By linking plantlevel data from the 1992 Annual Survey of Manufactures with CAO information from the Survey of Auxiliary Establishments, I examine manufacturing plants' practice of outsourcing services in relation to the size of the local service market surrounding the plant and that surrounding the plant's CAO. I found statistically signi¯cant evidence that the greater the size of local market surrounding a CAO, the higher the plant's probability of relying on the CAO for outsourcing advertising, bookkeeping and accounting, and legal services. These results are found even after controlling for the size of the local market surrounding a plant and plant characteristics. 
Introduction
Much of urban economics literature treats the¯rm as a single-establishment entity. Within such a framework, agglomeration economies in a city are considered to bene¯t only¯rms located in that city. 1 In reality, however, many¯rms are composed of multiple establishments, which are not necessarily located in the same geographic area. This paper examines the possibility of an establishment bene¯ting from agglomeration economies not only in its local market but also in other markets where a±liated establishments are located.
In my earlier work (Ono [20] ), I use data on manufacturing plants to examine the possibility that plants in larger local markets enjoy more cost reducing bene¯ts by outsourcing administrative services than plants in smaller local markets. Looking at a manufacturing plant's outsourcing probability as a function of the local market scale, and controlling for plant characteristics, I found that a signi¯cant proportion of the variation in outsourcing across U.S. counties can be explained by the variation in local market scale. However, I
also found that even after controlling for market scale in a location, there remains enormous variation in a plant's outsourcing probability based on plant characteristics. In particular, a plant's outsourcing probability drops signi¯cantly if it is a±liated with other plants or establishments. 2 This indicates that a manufacturing plant which has a separate head o±ce or other plants owned by the same company relies on these establishments in procuring services.
Moreover, it suggests that a plant can bene¯t if the market price of services is lower not only in its own local market but also in the markets surrounding a±liated establishments.
In this paper, I explore the mechanism behind intra-¯rm sharing of procuring services, focusing on the role played by a Central Administrative O±ce (CAO). CAOs include corporate headquarters and other o±ces that perform clerical, administrative, and managerial tasks, which are essential to any¯rm. These services can be performed either at the¯rm's main operating o±ces or at its factories. Many¯rms, however, locate their CAOs separate from their main production facilities, possibly to take advantage of characteristics of other cities such as the access to information, knowledge spillover from other CAOs, or access to more competitive suppliers of business services, which are suited to tasks of CAOs. While these factors are often pointed out in the literature of multi-plant¯rms and of headquarters (Fujita and Ota [8] , Brecher et al. [4] ), little empirical testing of their e®ects has been performed.
This study will focus on the CAO's access to competitive suppliers of services. 3 While CAOs can perform administrative services in-house, they also source such services from an outside market. 4 Therefore, the more competitive the market surrounding a CAO is, the more likely that outsourcing is performed at a CAO location rather than a plant location, allowing ā rm to source services inexpensively. There might be, however, some services which are tied to the location of the production facility. The e®ects of the market size of a CAO location in such a case will be also discussed in the paper.
Using data from Fortune 500, Holloway and Wheeler [11] provide evidence that a metropolitan economy's concentration in producer services provides the resources necessary to encour-age growth in the number of corporate headquarters. Using more complete data from the Survey of Auxiliary Establishments (see Section 3 for more detailed description of the data),
Davis [6] also provides evidence that a¯rm will locate its CAOs in a city with more service suppliers, even after controlling for the population in the city. However, whether or not the location of CAOs in°uences the e±ciency of remote plants has not yet been studied. In this paper, I test the hypothesis that a bigger local market scale surrounding a CAO allows its a±liated manufacturing plants to rely on the CAO for outsourcing services.
To test this hypothesis, I use plant-level data from the 1992 Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) portion of the Longitudinal Research Data Set (LRD) [29] , which provides information on manufacturing plants' outsourcing of administrative and clerical services.
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Outsourcing of such services has been a serious concern of many¯rms [17] . The corresponding high growth of service industries is also an important economic phenomenon in recent decades. However, the Census Bureau only started collecting data on the cost of outsourced services for such services in 1992. In this paper, I use this cost information to identify whether or not a plant outsourced a given service. Included in this study are four white-collar services; advertising, bookkeeping and accounting, legal services, and software and data-processing services.
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In addition to the ASM, I use the Survey of Auxiliary Establishments (SAE) [30] , which provides information on supporting establishments, including CAOs. 7 In 1992 in the U.S.,
5 Plant-level data from the 1997 ASM were not available to this study. 6 Siegel and Griliches [9] utilized the cost data of purchased services from the ASM of 1977 and 1982. However, in these earlier years, the survey included only repair services and communication service, which are not the focus of this paper. 7 Most of the existing literature on corporate headquarters use the data from Fortune 500, which include only public companies (Silton and Stanley [25] , Shilton and Webb [24] , and Holloway and Wheeler [11] ).
there were about 47,000 supporting establishments (including CAOs). Firms with such supporting establishments accounted for 40% of U.S. employment (calculated based on the 1992 Enterprise Statistics) [28] . Of all supporting establishments, about 70% are CAOs, which are the focus of this paper. Note that the CAOs in the SAE can be linked to the ASM plants at the¯rm level by using the common¯rm identi¯er in both data sets; this provides a unique opportunity to investigate the intra-¯rm sharing of the role of procuring services.
From these data, however, it is not possible to determine whether a plant relies on its CAO for outsourcing services. That is, if a plant did not outsource any amount of a given service, the data do not indicate whether a plant relied on its CAO for the service, or performed the service in-house. Therefore, in order to examine whether the market conditions surrounding a CAO have some in°uence on a plant's reliance on the CAO for outsourcing services, I use a model which links a plant's probability of outsourcing to the market conditions of its CAO.
In Section 2, I present a theoretical model which, unlike the model in Ono [20] , allows a plant to have access not only to its local market but also to the market surrounding its CAO. In the model, greater local demand for a service induces the entry of more suppliers, which in turn increases competition and lowers the market price of the service. Thus, if demand for a particular service is greater in the market surrounding a CAO, more suppliers will enter that market, lowering the market price of the service at the CAO's location. As a result, the plant will be more likely to depend on the CAO to outsource the service, and less likely to outsource the service in its local market.
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In contrast, the SAE is essentially a population survey which contains all auxiliary establishments (which include CAOs) of multi-plant¯rms in the U.S Economic Census.
I begin my empirical analysis by constructing an index to measure local market scale as in Ono [20] . Why this index is created, how it plays an important role in identifying the e®ect of market size and how the index is constructed are reviewed in Section 4.1. Using the index, I examine a plant's likelihood of outsourcing a given service in relation to the local market scale of both the plant's and its CAO's locations. The empirical results presented in Section 5 show that, for advertising, bookkeeping and accounting, and legal services, the greater market scale at a CAO location does decrease the plant's probability to outsource the service from its own local market; this indicates that a greater market scale surrounding the CAO allows a plant to source the service more inexpensively.
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For software and data-processing services, however, the results contradict the prediction of my theoretical model. The results indicate that as the market scale at a CAO's location increases, a plant is more likely to directly outsource from \its own" local market instead of relying on the CAO. A possible reason for this is discussed in Section 5, with a comparison between software and data-processing services and the three other services.
Theoretical Model
Let us consider a city with plants who are¯nal producers and whose choice of city is exogenous to the model and intermediate service suppliers whose choice of city is endogenous.
I assume that plants use a service as a production input, and that the market transactions county-level) prove that the local clustering of business activities in°uences a plant's decision of outsourcing. 9 Note that the results of my empirical testings are also consistent with a Dixit-Stiglitz type variety story in which variety increases with local market size (as in Homes [12] ). My results are also consistent with Hubbard [14] , who investigated the contractual form in local trucking markets and found that contracts, or more vertically integrated organization structure, are more likely to be chosen than simple spot arrangements when local markets are thin.
of the service are possible only within the same city. In the model, the technology and the number of plants in the city determine the local demand for the service, which will determine the number of service suppliers who decide to enter the local market. The entry process of service suppliers is modeled using the 2-stage Cournot oligopoly game. Note that I consider only plants who have a CAO owned by the same parent¯rm.
Plant's Probability of Outsourcing a Service: In order to procure a service, a plant can (i) perform the service in-house, (ii) purchase the service from the local market, or (iii) have its CAO purchase the service in the market in which the CAO is located. 10 Comparing the cost for each case, a plant chooses one of the above three alternatives. I assume that the plant and the CAO are located in di®erent cities, so that they face di®erent local market prices.
Let us assume that a plant's in-house production of a service requires only marginal costs -it occurs in a facility which has already been set up for¯nal production. I specify marginal costs of plant i, ± i , as
where A i is the set of characteristics of plant i and u i a zero-mean random disturbance.
Let us call the CAO of plant i, CAO i , and denote the unit cost of a service when a plant relies on a CAO for outsourcing the service by c i . c i is essentially the price that the CAO pays in its local market, which I denote byp. However, taking into account that a plant might not have accurate information on the market price that its CAO faces, I specify c i as
where ² i is a random component.
Let p stand for the local market price of the service that plant i faces in its local market.
Assuming that services are purchased only from suppliers in the same city, plant i outsources the service when p < ± i \ p < c i . Assuming that u i and ² i are independent and have distribution functions F (¢) and G(¢), respectively, from (1) and (2), the probability that plant i outsources by itself, P r os i , is written as
The plant's probability to outsource to its local market increases when the market price is lower in its own local market. However, the probability decreases when the market price is lower at the CAO's location, since the plant will then be more likely to depend upon the CAO for procuring the service.
Potential Demand and Outsourcing Demand for a Service: Based on (3), I derive the demand schedule that service suppliers face. First, suppose all plants were hypothetically to outsource the service by themselves. Then, for any market price, p, there would be a resulting demand for the service which I call potential demand. This demand essentially determines the extent of a market for a service and plays a key role in the empirical testing.
Let us assume that plants have an identical demand function for the service and specify it as µa(p), where µ is the demand shifter, 11 and a(p) is a downward sloping function of price.
In a city with N plants, the aggregate potential demand of the service, D p is written as
Since plants could perform the service in-house or ask its CAO to outsource, in order to derive the actual demand that service suppliers face, we should consider the probability that plants outsource by themselves; I call this actual demand the outsourcing demand. By multiplying the potential demand D p by the average probability of outsourcing (see (3)), the city's outsourcing demand for the service is written as
Here I assume that A i andp are exogenous to the determination of the demand schedule of a city where plant i is located. 12 Then, the inverse demand function is written as
where Q is the total amount of the outsourced service in the city.
Intermediate Service Suppliers: Facing the city's outsourcing demand schedule, service suppliers who have entered the local production maximize their pro¯ts with respect to (w.r.t.)
production. Denoting the pro¯t of supplier j in Stage 2 by ¼ j , the output level of supplier j by q j , and the marginal cost by a, we can write
while the marginal cost, a, might vary across locations, its relation to the city size is not clear. While the high wage in a big city might increase a, it should be o®set by higher labor productivity due to, for example, the knowledge spillover in a big city. Thus, in the theoretical model, I assume that the marginal cost is the same across geographical areas. In the estimation, these e®ects are controlled by population.
Supplier j maximizes ¼ j w.r.t. q j . The¯rst order condition (FOC) for this maximization is:
For simplicity, let us assume symmetry among the suppliers; q j = q = Q M 8j. Substituting q for q j in (7), p is solved as a function of M :
The typical solution for the Cournot oligopoly tells that as there are more suppliers in a market, the price approaches the marginal cost a.
The number of service suppliers M is determined in Stage 1, in which potential suppliers decide to enter production if their anticipated pro¯ts in Stage 2 exceed the sunk cost of entry ®. Under the assumption of symmetry, M is determined by the zero-pro¯t condition:
From (6), (7), and (10), the equilibrium number of suppliers M ¤ is solved as a function of potential demand attributes, µ and N . Using (9), the equilibrium price is also solved as a 13 Let R stand for the second derivative of ¼ j w.r.t. q j . From (7), the second order condition (SOC) is satis¯ed as long as R = 2
(N µ) 2 q < 0: To ensure well-behaved outcomes, I also assume the following condition which ensures that marginal revenue facing supplier j is steeper than the demand function (Long and Soubeyran [16] ): 2
Note also that, in a more general case where the price elasticity of the demand changes with µ and N , p is solved as a function of M, µ, and N. function of µ and N :
Equilibrium Price at the CAO Location: Then, how is the price determined at the market surrounding plant i's CAO? Analogous to the process described above, the market price at CAO i 's location is determined by two potential demand attributes in the CAO's city.
These attributes are the demand shifter and the number of plants in the market surrounding the CAO, and I denote them byμ andÑ , respectively. Let us denote the market price which CAO i faces byp. Analogous to (11),p is written as a function ofμ andÑ :
In principle, the number of all business establishments, including CAOs who require services, as well as the intensity of their use of the service would in°uence the market price of the service. How I deal with this issues in empirical testing is explained in Section 4.1. (See also footnote 16.) 14 Comparative Statics In this section, I show how the equilibrium value for a plant's probability of outsourcing is changed by the local market size at both the plant's and its CAO's locations. Note that it is not feasible to empirically test the e®ect of the number of suppliers M on the probability of outsourcing. Since M is jointly determined with the probability of outsourcing, M will be correlated with the error term with respect to a presence of¯xed e®ects speci¯c to a local market. 15 Therefore, I use the exogenous variables, µ and N , which determine the level of potential demand, and examine how these local potential demand attributes at a plant's and its CAO's locations in°uence the plant's probability of outsourcing.
Note also that, it is important to distinguish the e®ect of µ (μ) from those of N (Ñ ). Because, as opposed to N (Ñ ), which is measured by county population in the empirical section, the potential demand shifter (µ) will be calculated for each of four services and will more narrowly connect the local market scale to a plant's outsourcing decision for a speci¯c service.
From the previous section, under the assumption of symmetry, we know that (6), (7), and (10) must be met in equilibrium. First, in order to evaluate the impact of µ on the equilibrium price, I totally di®erentiate the system ((6), (7), (10)) w.r.t. p, q, M, and µ, and use Cramer's law, which yields the following expression:
where q ¤ is the equilibrium output level of a supplier and R is the second derivative of ¼ j w.r.t. q j . Since R is negative as long as the SOC holds, dp ¤ dµ < 0. Because of symmetry between µ and N in the model, (13) also implies that dp ¤ dN < 0. Unlike the typical positive e®ect of the demand upward shift on the price level, in my model, demand increase through µ and N attracts more service suppliers and enhances the competition among them, resulting in lower local market price. From (3), the lower market price at a plant location, p, increases the plant's probability of outsourcing. Now, let us examine how a plant's probability of outsourcing is a®ected by the exogenous increase in the local demand in the market where the plant's CAO is located. Analogous to the relationship between µ (or N ) and the market price at a plant's location, greater µ and/or N at a CAO location lowers the market price in that local market. From (3), this will make the plant more likely to rely on the CAO for procuring the service, and decreases the probability that the plant will outsource the service from its own local market, which I test in Section 5. I supplement these data with the 1992 Survey of Auxiliary Establishments (SAE ), which provides information on CAOs. The SAE collects data on supporting establishments, which perform services for other establishments of the same company rather than for other companies. This survey is essentially a population survey and inquiries are sent to all auxiliary establishments of multi-plant¯rms in the U.S Economic Census. The survey provides a va- 16 Mathematically, we can write dP r os dμ = @P r os @p dp dμ < 0: (14) riety of information, such as establishment location, employment by function, and so forth.
The survey also speci¯cally asks about the principal activity of each auxiliary establishment, which includes central administration, data-processing, R&D, warehousing, trucking, and so on. Included in this paper as CAOs are those which indicated their principal activity as central administration.
Using the common¯rm identi¯er in the ASM and the SAE, I link the ASM plants to the CAOs which belong to the same parent¯rm. Since the SAE covers essentially the population of auxiliary establishments, merging it with the ASM sample will enable us to categorize the ASM plants depending on whether there are a±liated CAOs. As shown in use county as the de¯nition of a local market.
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17 Using county instead of PMSA, I could increase the number of geographical units nearly 10 times. This provides more variability in my measure of the local market scale. The signi¯cant coe±cients obtained for the measure created at county-level also prove that the clustering of business activities within a county matters for a plant's choice of outsourcing. Note, however, that analyses at PMSA-level were performed for the model presented in Ono [20] , in addition to the county-level analyses. The qualitative results were not Source: Author's calculations based on data from LRD and the SAE Outsourcing Propensities: Next I report the outsourcing propensity of the plants in our sample. Using the 1992 ASM, I employ the observed cost of outsourcing in determining whether a plant outsources a given service. 18 As shown in Table 3 , outsourcing propensities di®er signi¯cantly, depending on whether or not a plant has a CAO. The percentage of plants which outsource by themselves is smaller for those which have CAOs, and greater for those which do not have CAOs. This supports the view that CAOs play a signi¯cant role in procuring services for their plants. 19 di®erent between two cases. 18 Plants are asked to report the costs of each service purchased from other companies that are paid directly by this establishments. Note that when we observe that some amounts are outsourced, it is possible that a plant also performs a fraction of the service in-house and/or asked the CAO to perform. Assuming that the fraction is exogenously determined, this will not qualitatively a®ect the main results of the estimation. 19 Note also that the outsourcing decision of plants varies within a¯rm. For example, of the¯rms with ve ASM plants in the sample, the fraction of those within which all plants outsource was .18. (11) and (12), assuming the linearity between variables and using standardization over the random components speci¯ed in (1) and (2), we can rewrite the probability that plant i outsources from its local market (see (3)) as follows:
where P 1i = ©[(1; µ; N; A i )¯];
and¯and ¿ are vectors of coe±cients. Note that µ, N ,μ, andÑ are county level variables. In the above equation, P 1i represents the probability that plant i chooses to directly outsource instead of performing the service in-house, and P 2i represents the probability that plant i chooses to directly outsource instead of depending on its CAO. As discussed in Section 2, we expect the coe±cients for µ to be positive and those forμ to be negative. Allowing the variances of u and ² in (1) and (2) to be di®erent, the coe±cients of µ and N in P 1 are di®erent from those in P 2 , but only in scale.
As for plant characteristics, I control for plant size, age, industry and a±liation type. I measure plant size by Beginning-of-Year Asset, which is determined before the decision is made and is therefore considered exogenous, at least in the short run. Plant age is calculated based on the¯rst year a plant started the current business. Both plant size and age are in logarithmic form. Industry is controlled by 2-digit SIC industry dummies. Another dummy is used to control for a±liation type. stands for the number of plants. However, considering that plant size is di®erent in reality, the use of population should capture total demand more realistically.
Note that plants in the data set often have multiple CAOs. Of all the CAOs in a¯rm, however, the CAO which in°uences a plant's outsourcing decision about a given service would be the one which is located in a city with a market price lower than that of other CAOs.
To select such a CAO, based on (11) and coe±cients estimated for µ and N in Ono [20] , I choose the CAO which has the lowest inferred market price among all CAOs in the samē rm.
Note also that, instead of limiting the sample only to plants with CAOs, I used all 45,144 plants include plants without CAOs; this will increase the e±ciency of parameters commonly estimated for all categories. For such plants, P 2 , the probability that a plant chooses local outsourcing instead of relying on CAOs, is set to 1. I also assume P 2 to be 1 for plants whose selected CAOs are in the same county as the plants. 20 Based on (15) , the likelihood function is written as
where B stands for the group of plants which have CAOs in di®erent counties, and C stands for all other plants. Y i is an indicator variable which equals to 1 if plant i directly outsources the service, and 0 otherwise.
Index for µ
Here, I summarize how I measure µ for each county. In Ono [20] , I showed that the demand shifter µ is a cost share parameter of the underlying Cobb-Douglas production function. The cost share parameter represents the intensity of the use of the service, which is likely to be di®erent across industries. Thus, in order to calculate the demand shifter of a particular county, I take the average of the intensity of the use of a service over local industries with share of industry as a weight.
More speci¯cally, let°l stand for the cost share of a given service of industry l at a national level, and ¾ kl the share of industry l in the total output of¯nal producers in county k. Following Ono [20] , with the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production function, µ in county k, which I denote by µ k , is constructed as
Since the use of a service di®ers across industries, di®erent industrial composition across counties produces di®erent intensities of the use of a service. 21 Note thatμ is µ of the county where the CAO is located.
To calculate µ, it would be ideal to take all industries' potential requirements of a service into consideration. However, since cost data for services, which allow me to calculate share parameters, are available only from the data on manufacturing industries to this study, µ is calculated based only on information of manufacturing sector. The exclusion of other industries does not change the qualitative result of the empirical estimation, as long as a service's cost share outside of the manufacturing sector is not systematically di®erent from that of the manufacturers.
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Based on the cost data from the 1992 ASM, I¯rst calculate°l for each of 140 3-digit manufacturing industries. To obtain ¾, I calculate each manufacturing industry's share of county manufacturing production using the Census of Manufactures in the LRD data set.
Then, to obtain µ for each county, following (17), I take the weighted average of°by using ¾ as a weight. Table 4 shows the summary statistics for potential demand shifters calculated for U.S. counties. The standard deviations of the potential demand shifters are quire large -as much as 30 to 49% of their means.
The plants in the sample are spread over 2,500 counties; this provides variation in µ for the estimation. Moreover, CAOs of the ASM plants are distributed across more than 500 counties instead of being located in a few major cities, which would also provide variation inμ andÑ for the estimation. Note that the correlation between µ andμ is quite small; 22 More speci¯cally, µ can be written as µ = µ(µ M ; µ S ; µ O ), where µ M is the demand shifter of the manufacturing sector, µ S is the demand shifter of the service sector, µ O is the demand shifter of other sectors. Therfore, dP r it is 0.0722 for advertising, 0.0306 for bookkeeping and accounting, 0.1081 for legal services, and 0.0546 for software and data-processing services. This precludes the possibility of multicollinearity in estimating the parameters in (15) . Note also that in Ono [20] , I also examined how µ correlates with the number of suppliers. I regressed the number of suppliers on µ and N for each of the four services.
23 µ obtained positive and signi¯cant coe±cients, which justi¯es my use of µ in capturing the e®ect of local market scale. Table 5 presents the results of the estimation. As discussed in Section 4, note that the coe±cients of µ and N in P 1 must be proportional to those in P 2 . I performed the estimations both with and without the restriction. For all four services, however, the likelihood ratio tests suggest the structure is the same for both constrained and unconstrained cases.
Empirical Results
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Here I present only the results from the unrestricted maximum likelihood analyses. 25 Notice that, as shown in Table 5 , the result obtained for software and data-processing services is 23 The data of the number of suppliers are provided in the County Business Patterns. 24 The null hypothesis that coe±cients of µ and N in P 1 are di®erent from these in P 2 only in scale passes the LM test at 10 % level. 25 Note that I also performed the analysis by controlling for the distance between a plant and its CAO. However, the qualitative results for the variables of interest remained the same.
somewhat di®erent from that of the other services in terms of the coe±cients obtained for demand shifters. Below, I discuss each case separately. Advertising, Bookkeeping and Accounting, and Legal Services: For these three services,μ obtained positive and signi¯cant coe±cients, which is consistent with my hypothesis. In addition, while they appear insigni¯cant, the coe±cients ofÑ have the expected sign. Recall thatμ andÑ are both negatively associated with the market price at the CAO location. Thus, the result suggests that, for these three services, the lower the market price that a CAO faces the more likely a plant is to have its CAO outsource the services. Given the size of the market at a plant's location, the greater scale of the market surrounding the CAO makes it more cost e®ective to outsource services at the CAO location.
Note that, in contrast toμ andÑ , both µ and N of a plant's location have negative signs, which are again consistent with my hypothesis. A plant's probability for a local outsourcing increases with the size of its own local market and decreases with the size of the market surrounding its CAO. Plants bene¯t from agglomeration economies in both their own and their CAO's localities. Recall that, by de¯nition given in (17) , the potential demand shifter represents the intensity of the use of a service averaged over the industries in a market.
Therefore, the statistically signi¯cant coe±cients obtained for both µ andμ indicate that a plant's outsourcing decision is in°uenced by the industrial composition not only of its local market but also of its CAO's. High concentration of industries that require intensive use of a given service will attract more suppliers and lower the market price of the service. Through intra-¯rm linkage, a plant can enjoy the concentration of such industries in both its CAO's locality and its own.
Based on Table 5 , I calculate the elasticities of the probability of a plant's direct outsourcing w.r.t.μ and µ. Di®erentiating P r os w.r.tμ and µ in (15) Based on these expressions, I calculate the elasticities presented in Table 6 . These numbers are evaluated at the mean of the characteristics of 19,788 plants with CAOs, which are summarized in Appendix A. In Table 6 ,P r 1 is the hypothetical outsourcing probability if a plant did not have a CAO.P r os is the predicted outsourcing probability, taking into account that a plant actually has a CAO.P r os is much smaller thanP r 1 , re°ecting the fact that a CAO plays a signi¯cant role in sourcing services. For advertising, the probability drops by as much as 27 percentage points, for bookkeeping and accounting, 38 points, and Table 5 , we can see that the coe±cient forμ andÑ obtain positive and signi¯cant coe±cients, suggesting that, for software and dataprocessing services, the lower the market price a CAO faces, the more likely it is that a plant will outsource the service by itself instead of relying on the CAO. This is contrary to my hypothesis. One might suspect that this was caused because some data-processing performed at CAOs might have been reported by a plant. However, the inquiry that the Census Bureau sent out to each plant clearly asked the plant to exclude the services provided by other establishments of the same company, including a separate central data processing unit. I performed the same estimation while controlling for whether a plant has a separate data-processing center in addition to CAOs. The result, however, was qualitatively the same.
It could be the case that the costs reported by plants include the signi¯cant amount of costs spent to purchase software and computer-programming services which directly help their manufacturing. Examples of such purchases are computer-aided design (CAD), computer-aided engineering (CAE), computer-aided manufacturing (CAM), digital data representation,°exible manufacturing system, technical data network and so forth. When a plant requires new manufacturing software, the plant will also require its employees (software users) to be trained by a software vendor so that they can implement the new software.
For training purposes, it would be convenient for a plant to deal with local suppliers who are more accessible than those who are in the market surrounding its CAO. In such a case, when a CAO learns the market price is low, it would just advise its plant to outsource the service instead of performing it in-house. Such e®ects could in principle also exist for advertising, bookkeeping and accounting, and legal services. The result shows that, however, for these three services, the e®ect that the lower market prices of a CAO make the CAO outsource these services for its plants, dominates the e®ect that a CAO advises plants to outsource.
Summary of the E®ects of Other Plant Characteristics: Finally, I summarize some interesting¯ndings on the e®ects of plant size and plant age shown in Table 5 . While it is not a focus of this paper, further examination of these attributes would make interesting future research.
For plant size, I obtain positive and signi¯cant coe±cients. As discussed in Ono [20] , this indicates the possible existence of scale economies in outsourcing services, which probably arise from¯xed costs in service transactions and the searching process for compatible suppliers.
The coe±cients for plant age are also positive and signi¯cant even after controlling for plant size. This indicates that older plants have a relative advantage in outsourcing services. While this might just re°ect the possibility that older plants renew their outsourcing contracts, it also suggests that younger plants face di±culties in¯nding compatible suppliers.
Conclusion
While many¯rms have CAOs which deal with management and administration of¯rms, little empirical testing has been performed to identify their in°uence on total e±ciency of¯rms. In this paper, I examine one aspect of the CAOs role and provide empirical evidence that a CAO helps its plants source services inexpensively. In particular, by examining manufacturing plants' decisions to outsource business services and how those decisions are in°uenced by local market conditions surrounding a CAO, I¯nd that, for advertising, bookkeeping and accounting, and legal services, the lower the market price to which the CAO has access, the more likely it is for a plant to rely on the CAO in outsourcing services.
I use industrial composition to construct an index to capture the market price in local markets. The results show industrial composition has signi¯cant impact in determining the market price of service. Moreover, it is shown that not only the industrial composition surrounding the plant but also the composition surrounding the CAOs are important for cost e®ectiveness of the plant. In particular, this result suggests that, when a CAO is located in the city with industries which use a given service intensively, suppliers of that service will be attracted into the city, and lower the market price that the CAO faces. Through the intra-¯rm provision of services from CAOs to plants, the lower market price at the CAO location will bene¯t plants located elsewhere.
The empirical¯nding of this study can be also interpreted as the result of a¯rm's choosing its CAO's location so that the CAO can better serve the rest of the¯rm by sourcing data-processing, and trucking services, and how the location of these establishments in°u-ences the e±ciency of the overall¯rm. These will be investigated in future research.
26 See Aksoy and Marshall [3] , Brecher et al. [4] , Rogerson [21] , Semple et al. [22] , and Semple and Phipps [23] 27 See Kolko [15] .
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